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I. INTRODUCTION
Your father can learn of his risk for cardiovascular disease early enough
to make a lifestyle change. Your mother’s neurological condition was made
easily diagnosable through antibody testing. Your sister can get genetically
screened during pregnancy without an increased risk of miscarriage. These
and other groundbreaking medical innovations have reframed healthcare.
Through patents, treatment innovations like these improved patient
outcomes, increased patient access, and revolutionized patient care.
However, the future of these groundbreaking innovations is uncertain. With
confusion surrounding the line differentiating patent eligible and ineligible
subject matter, growing concern over the cost of treatment, and fear over a
decrease in patient access due to patents, these innovations may soon be a
thing of the past.
In the last ten years, patent eligibility has seen a resurgence as a topic of
jurisprudence. Between 2010 and 2014, the Supreme Court made a series
of decisions that severely limited the scope of patentable inventions,
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reshaping the United States patent system.1 The current patentability test,
the Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc./Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International2 two-step test, has shrouded patent-eligibility in
ambiguity.3 The test strays from the constitutional and statutory language;
and is, instead, built upon judicially-created exceptions.4 The test first
requires a determination of whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of these judicially-created exceptions: “[a] law[] of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea[].”5 If the answer is yes, the Court looks to
the additional elements of the claim, individually and as a whole ordered
combination, to determine if it is enough to “transform the nature of the
claim.”6 If the claim is transformed, the patents are directed to one of the
patent-eligible exceptions.7 This analysis is called the “search for an
‘inventive concept.’”8 The Court explained the inventive concept as being
“an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’”9 The test’s application and outcome are the
primary sources of concern for innovation and patient care in the realm of
healthcare, directly impacting every one of our lives.
This Comment begins by discussing the relationship between innovation
and patents. Examining the origination of the concept of using patents to
incentivize innovation and build the economy. The Comment then goes on
to describe the history of patent eligibility, from the enactment of current
statutory language to the creation of the judicial exceptions that now frame
patent law. Specifically, looking at the development of the current
1. Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is
Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 946 (2017) (“Between 2010 and
2014, the Supreme Court issued four decisions that dramatically restricted the scope of inventions that
can receive patent protection: Bilski v. Kappos, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
Association for Molecular Pathology (“AMP”) v. Myriad Genetics, and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.”)
(citations omitted).
2. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
3. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 946 (positing the culmination of the decisions has
injected legal uncertainty into the U.S. patent system).
4. See Shahrokh Falati, To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish the Supreme Court Created
Exceptions to 35 U.S. Code Sec. 101, 28 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (2019) (discussing the judicially
created exceptions to Section 101).
5. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
6. Id. at 300.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 217–18.
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Mayo/Alice test and its impact on both patent law and innovation. Next,
this Comment analyzes the role the United States patent-system plays in
healthcare space. Specifically, analyzing the importance of innovation,
access to medicine, and cost as it impacts patient care. This Comment then
turns to a review of some of the most notable cases of the last five years in
the biomedical and software industries—particularly analyzing and
comparing the use of the Mayo/Alice test in determining subject matter
eligibility. Also contemplating its impact on innovation as a whole and in
the healthcare space. Given this precedent, the Comment goes on to
contemplate the Mayo/Alice test’s future impact on innovation and patient
access. Particularly, suggesting potential solutions to address concerns.
Finally, the conclusion hones in on the best way to streamline patent subject
matter eligibility in a way that continues to promote innovation, increase
access to healthcare, and improve patient care overall.
II. AN ECONOMY BUILT FROM INNOVATION
Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that Congress
shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”10 From the beginning of
our great nation, the power of patents and innovation in building the
economy has been known; though it took many years for this link to be fully
exercised. The Patent Act of 1952 substantively and procedurally
overhauled the obsolete patent system of the past.11 The Act simplified,
clarified, and codified the new, robust patent system.12 Its enactment is
considered to have started the “era of patent incentive and inclusion.”13
Shortly after, the United States—and the rest of the world—realized the
benefits innovation provide to the national and global economy. Studies
from 1957 showed that 50% to 60% of productivity growth could be
attributed to technological change and innovation.14
Thereafter,
economists conducted a myriad of studies linking innovation and economic
10. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 8.
11. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Attacking Innovation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1687, 1698–
99 (2019).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See David Hounshell, Innovation and Growth of the American Economy, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH.
INST. (Feb. 27, 2009), https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/innovation-and-the-growth-of-theamerican-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Y5FA-5E76] (discussing the finding of a study done by Robert
Solow).
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prominence. It is now stated as fact: “Innovation drives economic
growth.”15 America’s early, strong, innovation-incentivizing patent system
has been listed as a primary reason for the country’s rise to economic
preeminence,16 causing the United States to become the “gold standard” in
innovation and economic growth.17 As of late, however, the standard for
innovation has decreased.18 Recent years have seen diminished innovation
across all fields. Given the importance of the relationship between
innovation and economic growth to our nation’s future, it is vital to address
this topic. To further understand how to move forward, one must look to
the past.
III. EARLY DAYS OF SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
A. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.19
In 1948, the Supreme Court made the first decision that began to shape
the early days of patent-eligibility.20 Despite predating the Patent Act of
1952,21 the analysis of the claims plants the seeds for what would blossom
into modern statutory language.22 In this case, respondent brought a claim
against petitioner for infringement on their patent for a mixed-culture of
Rhizobia.23 The respondents discovered unique genes in the varying
species of Rhizobia that promoted nitrogen-fixing in different leguminous
plants could be isolated and recombined to form a “super Rhizobia” that
could be used across crops.24 Here, the Court ultimately decided the superstrain was not patent-eligible as it was a manifestation “of laws of nature,
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”25 The patent claimed
15. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, Executive Summary (2013), https://www.uscham
berfoundation.org/enterprisingstates/assets/files/Executive-Summary-OL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UH6Z-8V5S].
16. Id.
17. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 946 (citing the United States patent system as the
driving force behind the country’s innovative revolution).
18. See id. (suggesting the United States patent system has plateaued in recent years).
19. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
20. See id. at 132 (holding “product claims do not disclose an invention or discovery within the
meaning of the patent statutes”).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
22. Rebecca Lindhorst, Note, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter:
Why the Supreme Court Should Replace the Mayo/Alice Test, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 739 (2019).
23. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128–29.
24. See id. at 128–29 (describing the discovery, which gave rise to the patent claim in question).
25. Id. at 130.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6
1203-1244_ROBERT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1208

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

12/9/2022 2:38 PM

[Vol. 53:1203

nothing more than an enhanced-quality of the bacteria, which is inherently
a work of nature. This clarified that for the discovery of a natural
phenomenon to be patent-eligible, the same must be applied to achieve a
“new and useful end.”26 The Court reasoned since the non-inhibiting
species of Rhizobia could be combined to form a super-Rhizobia was not
inventive or complex; it found the same was nothing more than “the
discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not
patentable.”27 The ideas and analysis proffered in this opinion led to the
development of Sections 101 through 103, which focus on the definition of
eligible subject matter and requirements that the invention be novel and
non-obvious.
B. The United States Code
Section 101 of the United States Code, entitled “Inventions Patentable,”
does precisely that by providing the statutory language establishing the
standards, requirements, and exceptions to patentability.28 The current
version of the statute was enacted in 1952;29 though there have been many
amendments since, the language remains relatively unchanged. The statute
provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”30 Sections 102 and 103 provide
two additional requirements for eligibility, novelty, and non-obviousness.
Section 102 requires the subject matter be novel; more specifically, that the
material must be unique, original, something never seen, used, or described
in any official capacity.31 Section 103 requires the subject matter be nonobvious; particularly, that the material must not be conspicuous to anyone
with simple knowledge in the claimed patent’s field.32 The legal protection

26.
27.
28.
patent).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 131.
See 35 U.S.C.A § 101 (2018) (outlining the conditions and requirements of obtaining a
35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
35 U.S.C.A § 101.
35 U.S.C.A § 102.
35 U.S.C.A § 103.
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and precedent stemming from these statutes established the United States
as a leader in innovation.33
C. Parker v. Flook34
Thirty years after Funk Brothers and the enactment of the current statute,
the Supreme Court once again addressed subject matter eligibility. In this
case, respondent filed a patent claim on a “Method for Updating Alarm
Limits.”35 The claim contained a newly-discovered mathematical formula
inserted into an already known process for updating alarm limits.36 The
Court emphasized the importance of a proper interpretation of Section 101
and its objectives—reasoning a mathematical formula cannot be patented
regardless of its “post-solution activity” or limitation to a particular industry
or field.37 The mathematical formula is a law of nature and as such, when
added to any process, it is considered to have been part of the “prior art.”38
Here, the Court considered the entire process as a whole, including the
formula, and reasoned that the claim was not patent-eligible, as the only
distinction between the current process and the proposed patent claim is the
use of a law of nature.39
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on
the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of “discoveries” that
the statute was enacted to protect. The obligation to determine what type of
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether
that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious. . . . Even though a phenomenon
of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive
application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of

33. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 11, at 1696 (referring to the enactment of patent law as key
event in creating the robust patent system focused on incentivizing inventors); Madigan & Mossoff,
supra note 1, at 942 (discussing the long-standing reputation of the United States as a leader in
technology innovation and patenting).
34. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id. at 585–86.
37. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (holding the petitioner’s patent application
lacked patentability due to its mathematical nature); see also Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (finding a “postsolution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance”).
38. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592–93.
39. Id. at 594.
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such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application.40

The Court rationalized its findings by emphasizing a need for the broad
interpretation of Section 101 and consideration of the process as a whole.41
The Court asserted a narrow reading of Section 101 is flawed because it
would allow subject matter eligibility to be determined a “draftsman’s art.”42
With this opinion the Court reiterated the importance of the inventive
element observed in Funk Brothers, even though such language is absent in
the statute.
D. Diamond v. Chakrabarty43
Two years after Flook, a hallmark decision came in the subject matter
eligibility case of the Biotech Age.44 Along with expanding the scope of
patentable inventions, the relationship between patents and innovation
became abundantly clear following the Court’s decision in Chakrabarty. In
1980, the Supreme Court ruled that living organisms, here a genetically
modified micro-organism, fall under patent-eligible inventions.45 The
Court began its opinion by determining Section 101 was to be interpreted
as having a wide-scope; however, the Court recognized the existence of
some exceptions and limitations.46
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope.
The relevant legislative history also supports a broad
construction. . . . This is not to suggest that [Section] 101 has no limits or
that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral
discovered in the earth, or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable
subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.47

40. Id. at 593–94.
41. Id. at 594.
42. Id. at 593.
43. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
44. See Tup Ingram, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., The Product
of Nature Doctrine Revisited, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 385, 395 (2014) (naming Chakrabarty as the
revolutionary force beginning the biotech age).
45. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
46. Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 742.
47. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09.
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In establishing the statutory interpretation of Section 101, the Court created
the three judicial exceptions, framing the proceeding development of patent
law.
The Court continued its opinion, addressing the particular claims at issue.
The Court stated the language in the statute embraced the invention as it
constituted a “manufacture” or a “composition of matter” beyond what
organically exists in nature.48 The Court arrived at the conclusion of
patentability by looking at the claims as a whole, as opposed to individual
elements.49 Chakrabarty set a precedent of patent protection for pioneering
researchers and innovators, leading to dramatic advances in the
biotechnology and medical spaces.50 In the following decade, the United
Sates saw a surge of patents, which put the country at the forefront of the
biotechnological field.51
E. Diamond v. Diehr52
Immediately following the Chakrabarty decision, the Supreme Court again
expanded the scope of patent eligible inventions under Section 101. In
Diehr, the Court held a computer program was not precluded from patent
eligibility solely on the basis that it contained a known mathematical formula
or algorithm.53 The Court rationalized its decision by building on its
precedent established in Flook, which held unpatentable mathematical
equations and algorithms as abstract ideas, by considering the process as a
whole.54 Here, respondent sought to patent a manufacturing process for
curing rubber; the process combined a commonly used and well-known
mathematical equation with a series of other steps.55 The Court highlighted
that respondent did not seek to prevent the use of the equation, but “only
to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of
the other steps in their claimed process.”56 Alternatively, in Flook, the Court
asserted the patent was only for the mathematical formula as the claim did
48. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
49. Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 737 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
50. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 943 (describing the increase in medical advances
since the Chakrabarty decision using the “oncomouse” as an example).
51. See id. at 944 (“By first securing property rights in the fruits of biotech research, the U.S.
became the birthplace of the biotech revolution.”).
52. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
53. Id. at 187.
54. Id. at 188.
55. Id. at 178–79.
56. Id. at 187.
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not provide any steps or information on the calculation and monitoring of
the other variables.57
While Diehr significantly broadened the scope of patentability, as the
Court recognized “a new combination of steps in a process may be
patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well
known and in common use before the combination was made,”58 it also
highlighted the importance of language and specificity in patent claims.
These four Supreme Court decisions, among others, set an early
precedent for strong legal protection of patent claims.59 Innovation
boomed as inventors saw the fruits of their labor recognized.60 As a result,
the United States became the “gold standard” for patent eligibility in the
world.61 However, since 2010, this standard has come into question.62
Unbeknownst to all, hiding beneath these encouraging opinions were the
seeds of uncertainty and chaos.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAYO/ALICE TWO-STEP TEST
Almost three decades later, another series of four consecutive
Supreme Court decisions turned subject matter eligibility upside down.63
First, they severely narrowed the scope of patent eligible innovations.64 The
decisions created a new, more stringent test to evaluate eligibility,
significantly detracting from the gains achieved in Chakrabarty and Diehr.65
Second, the test also “injected tremendous legal uncertainty into the U.S.
patent system . . . .”66 The proper application and interpretation of the
Mayo/Alice two-step test is still in question today.

57. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1948).
58. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
59. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 11, at 1706 (discussing the overall strength of the patent
system following the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the establishment of the Federal Circuit for
patent cases, and subsequent case law).
60. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 946.
61. Id. at 939.
62. See id. at 946 (noting United States’ recent case law as a major setback in technological
innovation).
63. See generally id. (citing four different cases “dramatically restrict[ing] the scope of inventions
that can receive patent protection . . . .”).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 946–47.
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A. Biliski v. Kappos67
In 2010, the Court heard an issue of first impression—whether new and
useful business methods are patentable as a “process” under Section 101.68
In Biliski, petitioner’s patent application sought protection of a procedure
“for instructing buyers and sellers [on] how to protect against the risk of
price fluctuations in a discrete section of the economy.”69 The Court held
business methods are patent-eligible so long as they meet the Act’s other
requirements: “novel, . . . nonobvious, . . . and fully and particularly
described . . . .”70 Despite this determination, the Court ultimately held that
the claim in question was not patent-eligible as opposed to an “abstract
idea.”71 In making its conclusion, the Court attempted to rely on precedent,
when in actuality it “provided no legal guidance on how to determine what
counts as an unpatentable ‘abstract idea,’ creating a[] [more] ambiguous legal
precedent . . . .”72 This lack of evidenced reasoning became the “rose-bud”
from which uncertainty grew.73 The Court’s failure to provide a bright-line
test for subject matter eligibility left the lower courts to flounder; offering
no guidance other than if the claim is “connected to a specific machine or
transforms an article,”74 it may be patent eligible subject matter.75 The
following years saw “mass invalidation of patents on software, business
methods, and diagnostic methods with vague or conclusory court
opinions . . . .”76 As such, the Bilski decision77 marked the beginning of a
downfall of innovation.
67. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
68. Id. at 598.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 602.
71. Id. at 598.
72. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 947; see Alexa Johnson, Note, A Crisis of Patent Law and
Medical Innovation: The Category of Diagnostic Claims in the Wake of Ariosa v. Sequenom, 27 HEALTH MATRIX
435, 445 (2017) (highlighting the conclusory style of the Court’s opinion in reliance on prior precedent
and lack of direction it provided); Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 745 (arguing the Court’s reliance on prior
case law on patent-eligible subject matter provided little instruction regarding the rejection of patents
and the test overall).
73. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 948 (emphasizing Binski’s creation of confusion and
ambiguity surrounding patentability); see also Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 745 (describing the Court’s
reliance on prior patent-eligibility decisions as opposed to providing additional guidance on patenteligible subject matter).
74. Stefania Fusoco, Is In re Bilski a Déjà Vu?, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 143, 143 (2009).
75. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 598 (describing the machine-or-transformation test as useful but not
a determinative tool).
76. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 947–48.
77. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010).
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B. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.78
Two years later, the Court built on its Bilski decision. In this case, the
Court determined whether processes that helped physicians determine
proper dosage levels of thiopurine drugs used to treat autoimmune diseases
were patent-eligible subject matter.79 Unlike in Bilski, this was not a
fundamental question of whether medical treatment methods as a whole are
patentable.80 Instead, this was a specific and directed claim question. This
case saw the introduction of the two-step test for patent-eligible subject
matter.81 In the test, the Court first determines whether the claim is
directed toward a patent-ineligible subject.82 The patent-ineligible subjects
consist of three judicially created exceptions, “a law[] of nature, abstract
idea[], and physical phenomena . . . .”83 If it is, the Court then analyzes
whether there is something else in the claim that transforms it into patenteligible subject matter.84 The Court decided that the “method of treatment”
in this case was not patent eligible as it was a “law of nature.”85 The analysis
focused on whether the “law of nature” was significantly added to in order
to transform the claim, the second step of the test.86 Here, the Court
provided a somewhat conclusory style opinion, relying, yet again, mostly on
prior case law. Ultimately, the Court held the claim did not add “enough”
to the law of nature but failed to describe what would constitute

78. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
79. Id. at 72.
80. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610.
81. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76.
82. See id. at 77 (indicating determination of ineligible due to direction to one of the natural or
abstract exceptions must occur first and triggers further analysis); see also Johnson, supra note 72, at 445
(describing the elements of the redefined test introduced in Mayo).
83. Johnson, supra note 72, at 436.
84. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77 (explaining after the Court determines ineligibility due to direction
to one of the natural or abstract exceptions, the Court then asks “do the patent claims add enough to
their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible
processes that apply natural laws?”); see also Johnson, supra note 72, at 445 (explaining this must be more
than just a natural phenomenon, for example).
85. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89.
86. See id. at 77–78 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law
of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself. A patent, for example,
could not simply recite a law of nature and then add the instruction ‘apply the law.’”); see also Johnson,
supra note 72, at 445 (introducing the confusion of courts and inventors alike when it comes to the
“transformation” process).
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“enough.”87 The Court provided no guidance or explanation of their
reasoning outside of that the process was a “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field.”88 This
rationalization stemmed from the comparison of this case to both Flook and
Diehr, two seemingly irreconcilable cases.89 Despite differing approaches
and outcomes, the Court indicated Flook and Diehr accurately represented
the precedent set for claims, including abstract ideas or the laws of nature.90
In Flook, the Court inspected each element for something “more” but
eventually held the method for adjusting alarm limits patent-ineligible;
asserting the claim did little more than add a novel mathematical algorithm
to an already-established process for adjusting alarm limits.91 Conversely,
in Diehr, the Court inspected the claim as a whole and held patentable a
process for molding raw, uncured rubber into various useable products;
asserting the claim, once again, added a novel mathematical equation into a
process, but did so to a previously unestablished or non-obvious
combination of widely-used steps.92 The petitioner claimed the inclusion
of a non-patentable law of nature or abstract idea into an “inventive”
process transformed the claim into patent-eligible subject matter.93
However, the Court determined the claim in question here more closely
aligned with Flook—combining conventional steps in recognition of the

87. See Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 82 (2013) (emphasizing
the lack of direction provided by the Court regarding subject matter eligibility); Timo Minssen & David
Nilsson, The US Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus––Taking the Fire from or to Biotechnology and
Personalized Medicine, 2 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 376, 382 (2012) (highlighting the Court’s lack
of guidance in explaining its decision).
88. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 69.
89. Id. at 80; see Chao, supra note 87, at 89 (asserting the uncertainty surrounding subject matter
eligibility stems from the use of two irreconcilable cases as guideposts for the conclusion); Ethan M.
Weiner, Defining a Natural Phenomenon after Prometheus, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 643, 669 (2013) (“The
vastly different approaches taken by Flook and Diehr render the Prometheus analysis internally
inconsistent.”).
90. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 80 (stating both Flook and Diehr address claims involving an equivalent
law of nature).
91. Accord id. (summarizing the holding of Flook); Weiner, supra note 89, at 669 (“But in
application, the Court dissected the claims and examined each step for something more than
conventional activity, precisely the methodology used in Flook.”).
92. Accord Mayo, 566 U.S. at 80 (summarizing the holding of Diehr); Weiner, supra note 89, at 669
(“The Prometheus Court reiterated the requirement in Diehr that the claim should be analyzed as a whole,
and even emphasized that a novel combination of known steps may still be patentable.”).
93. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 81; see Johnson, supra note 72, at 448 (detailing the rationalization behind
the Mayo Court’s interpretation of Diehr).
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biological relationship between thiopurine and metabolites to treat
patients—than to Diehr, ruling it ineligible-patent subject matter.94
The Court begins to blur the line between subject matter eligibility,
novelty, and non-obviousness by bringing back the “inventive concept” first
discussed in Flook.95 This focus on the “inventive” application of the patent
goes beyond the statuary language of Section 101, which is solely concerned
with whether the claim is directed toward a “process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”96
The reach beyond the statutory language, coupled with a lack of guidance
outside established precedent, produced confusion.97 The lower courts
were left to navigate the waters of this new test with nothing more than the
precedent they were already struggling to interpret and apply.98 Mayo
Collaborative Servs. is of particular impact and importance in medical
diagnostic and therapeutic treatment methods, where individual steps of
processes are often considered “laws of nature.”99 This decision only added
to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding subject matter eligibility.100
Moreover, like its predecessor, Mayo Collaborative Servs. led to high levels of
patent invalidation.101
C. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics102
In the following year, the Court once again addressed what is eligible
subject matter under Section 101.103 In Myriad Genetics, the Court was asked
whether or not DNA that was isolated and used in a diagnostic process

94. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82 (“The claim before us presents a case for patentability that is weaker
than the (patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.”).
95. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
96. 35 U.S.C.A § 101 (2018).
97. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 437 (“The lack of clarity means there is confusion between
the USPTO, the district courts, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court about which diagnostic
methods are patent-eligible uses of a natural phenomenon.”).
98. See id. (noting the excess of litigation that rose from the lower courts’ attempt to provide
clarity in the patent system).
99. See id. at 446 (highlighting the opinion of two Federal Circuit Court judges stating the Mayo
test is not the appropriate standard in these fields as it may discourage innovation).
100. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 948; see Weiner, supra note 89, at 644 (“Instead, the
granting of certiorari was nothing more than the song of Sirens, leaving inventors shipwrecked on an
island of patentable subject matter confusion. The Prometheus Court failed to deliver any clear rule
controlling patentable subject matter for process claims.”).
101. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 948–49.
102. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
103. Id. at 579–80.
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constituted a patent-eligible claim.104 The patent in question is a prime
example of the kind of innovation that saves lives. The isolated DNA
segments were BRCA1 and BRCA2.105 These specific DNA segments
directly correlate to a women’s predisposition for contracting breast
cancer.106 In previous, early twentieth-century decisions, “the isolation of
molecules and other organic elements that were of valuable use in medical
treatments, such as adrenalin and insulin, had long been recognized as
patentable discoveries . . . .”107 However, again following the trend of its
more recent predecessors, the Court decided that the isolated DNA was a
“law of nature” and therefore, ineligible for patent protection.108 However,
the complementary created, cDNA, was patent-eligible subject matter.109
Once again, there was little guidance for this decision other than prior case
law.110 Here, the Court relied on Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty to establish
precedent; these cases, though similar, had very different outcomes.111 In
Chakrabarty, the Court held patentable a genetically modified bacterium
designed to more efficiently degrade oil; the claim was for a naturally
occurring micro-organism that had four plasmids added to it to create a
greater capacity for oil degradation.112 The Court maintained the addition
of these plasmids gave the bacterium “markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature,” transforming the micro-organism into patenteligible subject matter.113 Conversely, in Funk Brothers the Court held a
“super-Rhizobia” designed to enable nitrogen fixing across various
leguminous plants patent-ineligible; the claim was for a newly created
species of Rhizobia, which was derived by isolating the non-inhibiting
bacteria from the existing six species to allow for nitrogen fixation across

104. Id. at 580.
105. Id. at 583.
106. Id.
107. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 949; see Falati, supra note 4, at 17 (“Going against three
decades of practice to the contrary at the time, Justice Thomas for the Supreme Court held that while
claims directed specifically to the complementary DNA (cDNA) for the breast cancer genes, BRCAl
and BRCA2, were patent-eligible, claims to an isolated nucleic acid encoding the BRCAl/2 genes were
not patent eligible because they are ‘a natural product.’”).
108. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591.
109. Id. at 595.
110. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 950.
111. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 590–91 (discussing the applicability of precedent set
in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers).
112. Accord id. at 590 (summarizing the holding of Chakrabarty).
113. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
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crops.114 The Court asserted that the new composition was not patenteligible subject matter as the same did not create or alter anything that was
not an already-present quality of the bacteria in nature, i.e., there was no
transformation.115 In Myriad Genetics, the Court found Myriad’s isolation
more analogous to the claim in Funk Brothers; the isolation of the genes did
nothing to transform the naturally occurring character of the DNA.116
Alternatively, the created cDNA had been transformed—the cDNA retains
some of the naturally occurring characteristics—where “it is distinct from
the DNA from which it was derived.”117
Much like its predecessor, the focus on the inventive concept and the
reliance on precedent, which provided minimal guidance, scarcely clarified
the issue of patent-eligible subject matter.118 Myriad Genetics left a cloak of
ambiguity surrounding the future of thousands of current and pending
patents.119 Of particular concern was the impact of investments in research
and development on innovation.120
This fundamental legal uncertainty, the threat of zero legal protection, and the
inability to recoup hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D expenditures, has
placed the biotech and pharmaceutical industries in a quagmire that will
swallow up and stifle future innovation like the discovery of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.121

114. Accord Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591 (summarizing the holding of Funk Bros).
115. See id. (“The Court held that the composition was not patent eligible because the patent holder
did not alter the bacteria in any way.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 595.
118. Id. at 591.
119. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 948–49; see Ashish M. Bakshi, Gene Patents at the
Supreme Court: Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 1 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 183, 183 (2014)
(highlighting the array of litigation resulting from the uncertainty created by Myriad).
120. Arun J. Mohan, Process Stories: Patenting Natural Law Processes under Prometheus—How Much
Addition to a Patent Claim Is Enough?, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 160, 161 (2014)
(“The incentive [to innovate] has disappeared due to recent court decisions regarding the patentability
of diagnostic methods involving biological processes.”).
121. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 950 (footnote omitted).
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D. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International122
These decisions culminated in 2014 with the establishment of the
Mayo/Alice two-part test.123 Presenting an issue of first impression, the
Court in Alice set out to address the fundamental question of whether
“computer-implemented schemes,” or software programs, were patenteligible under Section 101.124 Despite an intention to broadly address the
topic, the Court ultimately ruled on the specific patents in question.125 The
claims at issue in Alice concerned a “computer-implemented scheme for
mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial
transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary.”126
The Court ultimately decided the claims were not patent-eligible, as they
were directed to an “abstract idea” and contained no transformative steps
or processes to apply the idea.127 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court
applied and affirmed the two-step test first seen in Mayo.128
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims
before us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim
both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible
application. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
“‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”129

Following the trend of its predecessors, the Court again provided little
direct guidance, instead relying on prior case law. To support its conclusion

122. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
123. See Ilija Ilijovski, Perfecting U.S. Patentable Subject Matter—Merging the European Approach and
the American Principles, 19 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 182, 188 (2019) (asserting Alice is the most
crucial of the current cases on subject matter eligibility).
124. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 212.
125. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 950 (explaining the Court’s narrow scope of
determining this particular patents’ validity instead of making determinations for the eligibility of
computer-implemented inventions as a whole).
126. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 212.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 217 (In Mayo, the Court “set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.”) (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 217–18.
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that the “computer-implemented scheme” was an abstract idea, the Court
looked to Bilski.130 In Bilski, the Court held the method for protecting
against financial risk is patent-ineligible subject matter as an “abstract
idea.”131 The Court provided no explanation other than that hedging the
risk was common, “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce and taught in introductory finance . . . .”132 The Court
analogized the “computer-implemented scheme for mitigating settlement
risk” to the method for hedging against financial risk.133 The Court asserted
a third-party intermediated settlement is also an established practice in the
commerce system.134 This commonality and pervasiveness alone was
sufficient for the claims to constitute “abstract ideas.”135
After a conclusory determination of the claim as an “abstract idea,” the
Court then determined whether the claim had transformed into patenteligible subject matter through the presence of an “inventive concept.”136
In this step, the Court looked to Mayo, Flook, and Diehr for support of its
finding of ineligibility. In Mayo, the Court held patent-ineligible a method
for properly determining the dosage of thiopurine to administer to
autoimmune patients, asserting the claimed processes did little more than
combine already established natural laws into a singular method.137 The
combination of conventional steps with an instruction to “apply it” is
inadequate to transform the claim into an application of natural law.138 As
is the case here and in Flook and Diehr, the introduction of a computer does
not impact the analysis.139 In Flook, the Court held a computerized method
for adjusting alarm limits patent-ineligible; asserting the claim simply added
a novel mathematical algorithm to an already established, computerized
process to monitor and adjust alarm limits.140 Conversely, in Diehr, the
Court held patentable a computer-implemented process for molding raw,
130. Id. at 218.
131. See id. at 219 (describing the courts’ unanimous finding that the patent at issue was in fact
an abstract idea).
132. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010).
133. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 212, 219 (showing how risk hedging in Bilski is similar to the
idea of intermediated settlement in Alice).
134. Id. at 219.
135. Id. at 221.
136. Id.
137. Accord id. (summarizing the holding in Mayo).
138. Accord id. at 222 (interpreting analysis of Mayo).
139. See id. (“[S]imply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a
computer, [i]s not a patentable application of that principle.”).
140. Accord id. (summarizing holding of Flook).
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uncured rubber into various useable products; the claim once again added a
novel mathematical equation into a known technological process.141
However, the Court argued “the claims . . . were patent eligible because they
improved an existing technological process, not because they were
implemented on a computer.”142 The improvement of the existing
technology, not the computer’s presence, ultimately led to the determination
of patent-eligibility.143 The Alice Court provided that under precedent, the
claim did nothing more than instruct the user “to apply the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.”144
The Court first analyzed the claim’s elements individually, finding the
“function performed by the computer at each step of the process [were]
‘[p]urely conventional.’”145 Next, the Court considered the claim as a
whole, ordered combination, and found the method “simply recite[d] the
concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic
computer.”146 Like Mayo and Flook, the Court decided there was no
“inventive concept” that transformed this claim.147
Alice is the cornerstone case for patent-eligible subject matter. Despite
the establishment of a test, ambiguity persists in surrounding patent-eligible
subject matter.148 A significant portion of this ambiguity can be attributed
to the Court’s differing interpretations of Diehr.149 In Mayo, the Court
justified its ruling by interpreting the patentability of the claims in Diehr to
stem from the addition of the natural law to a process not previously
established.150 While in Alice, the Court instead interpreted the patentability
141. See id. at 223 (describing the holding in Diehr and how the Court came to a different
conclusion).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 225 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 81
(2012)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 222–23.
148. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 951 (offering an explanation of why the lack of
reasoning from the Court in Alice has led to ambiguity); see also Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 748
(recognizing the alarmingly high levels of patent invalidation following the implementation of the
Mayo/Alice test); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of
Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1822 (2014) (asserting the Court’s lack of clarity in patent
eligibility has created uncertainty at every level) [hereinafter Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad].
149. See Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad, supra note 148, at 1808 (explaining the Court’s
reference to Diehr in theory but not in practice).
150. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 81 (2012) (“[T]he overall process [of the] patent [was] eligible because
of the way the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole.”).
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of the claims to stem from the improvement of the existing process as a
whole.151 This is significant because it can alter the primary inquiry of the
second step in the Mayo/Alice two-step test. If the characterization of Diehr
in Mayo is used, the main inquiry is whether the process is novel and nonobvious.152 This reaches past the statutory language of Section 101 into
Sections 102 and 103, adding a much harsher limit on patentability.
Alternatively, if the characterization in Alice is used, the main inquiry is
whether the addition of the natural law improves the established process as
a whole.153
Due to the confusion surrounding interpretation and application of the
Mayo/Alice test, concern is growing among investors and inventors. Where
previously, the United States stood out for its strong patent protection, it
now stands out for “unstable and unpredictable standards in such
fundamental areas as patentable subject matter and [eligibility] . . . .”154
E. The Aftermath of Alice
Never, in the history of the American-patent system, has there been a
time of less clarity regarding patentable subject matter.155 The lack of clarity
and predictability is directly attributed to the judiciary. The Supreme Court
reached far beyond the statutory language of Section 101, blurring the lines,
and adding new ones. In its opinions, the Court has been incoherent and
provided no guidance for untangling the lines of precedent justifying its
decisions.156 These decisions have led to a rise in subjectivity.157 Some

151. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223.
152. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 449 (describing the effect of the Court viewing the
patentability of claims as a combination of the conventional steps and natural principle components).
153. Id.
154. Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2019).
155. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions,
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 649 (2015).
156. Id. at 650.
157. See Scott Frederick Peachman, The Patent Eligibility of Diagnostic Methods after Prometheus:
A Redefined Test for Transformation, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 589, 609 (2013) (discussing the danger of
subjectivity that has arisen as a result of the Court’s opinion); Andrew A. Toole & Nicholas A.
Pairolero, Adjusting to Alice: USPTO Patent Examination Outcomes After Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International 4 (Apr. 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCEDH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4U-J5VJ] (“The increase in uncertainty seems to
reflect the interpretive latitude in the language of the Alice standard . . . .”).
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have said the only determining factor in subject matter eligibility rests on
selection of the panel.158
In response to this lack of clarity, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
and courts rejected and invalidated countless patents covering innovation in
various fields, namely, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and life sciences
following Alice.159 In an attempt to track the rate of these invalidations, a
researcher conducted periodic reviews of the average invalidation rate
among the three court levels at one-, two-, and five-years post-Alice.160 The
data showed that a year after Alice the average rate of invalidation was
82.9%.161 The rate declined in both the two-year and five-year points,
holding at 78.2% and 56.2%, respectively.162 Though declining, an
invalidation rate of over 50% does not breathe confidence into investors or
inventors.
To further quantify the effects, two researchers conducted a study
focusing on the invalidation of personalized medicine patents.163 The data
showed a sharp increase of subject matter invalidations following Mayo, with
growth continuing after both Myriad and Alice.164 More specifically, 86.4%
of the office decisions issued by the PTO post-Mayo included rejections for
subject matter eligibility, as opposed to 15.9% pre-Mayo.165 In another
study surveying Section 101 rejection data provided by the United States
PTO, researchers found an uptick of rejections in both the software,
including biotechnology, and medical diagnostic art units.166 Particularly in
the software and biotechnology art units, the month after Alice was decided,
158. See Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad, supra note 148, at 1823 (arguing the only
determining factor regarding patent-eligibility is the selection of the panel leading to mass uncertainty
and invalidation).
159. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 951–52.
160. See generally Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 534 (2015) (providing the researcher “investigates Alice’s effects
at its one-year anniversary by reviewing how the courts . . . have applied Alice since its issuance”).
161. Id. at 540.
162. Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
354, 359 (2016); Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY- O PAT. L.J. 25, 27
(2019).
163. See generally Bernard Chao & Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on Personalized
Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 10 (2016) (describing general set up, methods, and limitations of
data used to assess invalidation rates post-Mayo).
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 12.
166. See generally Colleen Chien & Jiun Ying Wu, Decoding Patentable Subject Matter,
2018 PATENTLY- O PAT. L.J. 1 (2018) (describing the general set up, methods, and limitations of the
data used to assess Section 101 rejection rates).
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Section 101 rejections increased from 25% to 81%; the level of rejections
remained fairly consistent at or around 75% for the remaining months of
data.167 Similarly, in the month after Mayo, the medical diagnostic art unit
saw an increase in Section 101 rejections from 7% to 32%; the level of
rejections continued to rise, reaching a peak of 64% post-Alice.168
Consequently, the United States is no longer the leader in patent protection
rights.169
The Mayo/Alice test has developed a reputation for being uncertain and
overly restrictive.170 Moreover, there is no consistency in how the test is
applied and interpreted,171 and the test is overly restrictive by invalidating
patents across nearly every sector.172 However, even the Court warned
against allowing the interpretation of Section 101 and application of the
Mayo/Alice test to significantly impede innovation, which it clearly seems to
be doing, particularly in the healthcare space.173
V. PATENTS AND PATIENTS
If innovation drives economic growth, then it follows that innovation in
industries, which account for a large portion of the economy, are vital to an
economy’s stability and continued growth. One such industry is healthcare.
Healthcare is consistently ranked as one of the top five industries in
contributions to the gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States.174
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id.
169. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Innovation Policy Center, Art of the Impossible 45
(2020), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/023881_gipc_ip_index_2020_fullreport_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AV9-PQ4J] (inferring from the graph that the U.S. now ranks fifth in
patent protection rights).
170. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 952 (determining the impact of the Mayo/Alice test
and its restrictive nature on applied-for and issued patents).
171. Id.; see Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad, supra note 148, at 1823 (highlighting the
disparities among circuit court judges regarding which test should be applied and the applicability of
said test).
172. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 1, at 952.
173. See id. (“Inventors, investors, and companies working in the innovation industries have
little to no understanding how to create and commercialize the medical and high-tech innovation . . .
[that is relied] on in the twenty-first century.”).
174. See Benjamin Elisha Sawe, The Biggest Industries in the United States, WORLD ATLAS (Aug. 1,
2017),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-are-the-biggest-industries-in-the-united-states.
html [https://perma.cc/A5MW-A7K2] (listing health and social care as the fourth largest industry in
the U.S. in 2017); Samuel Stebbins, These are the Largest Industries in Every State, USA TODAY (Aug. 31,
2018, 8:35 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2018/08/27/largest-industry-
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Healthcare is also considered the top industry driving economic growth
following the last recession.175 The healthcare sector is an essential part of
the United States’ economy, and more importantly our lives. The
innovations that flow from this sector do more than just grow the economy;
they save lives, prolong life expectancy, and increase quality of life.
Maintaining these innovations should be of the upmost importance.
Just as the United States is regarded as the leader in overall innovation, it
is also the leader in healthcare innovation.176 The country has the largest
healthcare sector in the world and leads innovation in both the medical and
scientific fields.177 Yet, all of that is at risk. The weakening of the patent
system by judicial interpretation has brought concern to investors and
inventors in this sector.178 In an industry where patents are considered the
standard for protection, uncertainty in patentable-subject matter is the
in-each-state/37585051/ [https://perma.cc/9MK6-C7GH] (listing ambulatory and outpatient
healthcare services as the second largest industry nationwide in 2018); Rumki Majumdar & Daniel
Bachman, Changing the Lens: GDP from the Industry Viewpoint, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (July 25, 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/spotlight/economics-insights-analysis-07-201
9.html [https://perma.cc/SB4A-9P8W] (listing educational services, healthcare, and social assistance
as the fifth largest GDP contributing group in 2019); Biggest Industries by Revenue in the US in 2021, IBIS
WORLD, https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/industry-trends/biggest-industries-by-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/QXS5-2R5V] (predicting three of the top ten industries of 2021 will be in the
healthcare sector).
175. See Alison L. Deutsch, The 5 Industries Driving the U.S. Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 6,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/042915/5-industries-driving-useconomy.asp [https://perma.cc/7MQD-32AL] (explaining how the health sector added jobs and aided
the economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008).
176. Grace-Marie Turner, Though the U.S. Is Healthcare’s World Leader, Its Innovative Culture Is
Threatened,
FORBES
(May 23,
2012,
2:29 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gracemarieturner/2012/05/23/though-the-u-s-is-healthcares-worldleader-its-innovative-culture-is-threatened/?sh=6b4008d277eb [https://perma.cc/A4T6-DMQW].
177. See Gregg Girvan & Avik Roy, United States: #4 in the World Index of Healthcare Innovation,
FOUND. FOR RSCH. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (Sept. 4, 2020), https://freopp.org/united-stateshealth-system-profile-4-in-the-world-index-of-healthcare-innovation-b593ba15a96 [https://perma.cc
/RUR9-9GPX] (providing data to show the U.S.’s rank and overall standing when it comes to medical
innovation); see also Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States,
Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 225 (2002)
(asserting the United States biotechnology sector is a world leader and pushing the development of
international markets).
178. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101
Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 583 (2018) (asserting the
judicial decisions are to blame for the erosion of patent protection in healthcare); The Global Innovation
Index 2019: Creating Healthy Lives—The Future of Medical Innovation, Cornell Univ., INSEAD, & WIPO
53
(2019),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GL7P-UG7P] (stating the future of medical innovation lies in the hands of the
judiciary and the legislature).
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enemy.179 Despite the optimistic links between patents, innovation, and
economic growth, there is more to consider in the healthcare industry—the
patient.
Since the beginning of the United States patent system, there has been
concern over the role of patents in increasing patient cost, decreasing patient
access, and hindering the innovation of life-saving treatments.180 There is
some truth in every fear; the key is knowing when the benefits exceed the
potential negatives.
The perception is that patents afford the inventor, usually a very wealthy
biotech or pharmaceutical company, the ability to charge astronomical rates
for a necessary treatment, as they have a monopoly on the market. The
reality is that this occurs only to an extent. Data shows that, following patent
expiration, the average drug cost decreases 38% to 48%.181 While in most
cases the patent holders charge a premium, the intention of this patent
monopoly is for the holder to recoup their investment cost.182 Today the
average biotech innovation costs anywhere from $300 million to $2.6
billion.183 Without the opportunity to recapture these sunk costs,
innovation would decrease. This is what we are seeing now. The
uncertainty of patentable-subject matter has driven start-ups and investors
179. See Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The Importance of Patents to Innovation: Updated Cross-Industry
Comparisons with Biopharmaceuticals, 25 EXPERT OP. ON THERAPEUTIC PATS. 739, 741 (2015) (“Eightynine percent of respondents in the healthcare (including biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and medical)
industry characterized patents as ‘extremely important’ in ‘creating a competitive advantage for your
organization . . . .’”); see generally Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation
and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 295 (2007) (arguing the
importance of patents, particularly gene patents, in maintaining and incentivizing innovation).
180. See generally Cynthia M. Ho & Ann Weilbaecher, An Introduction––Patents Versus Patients:
Must We Choose?, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L., at i, ii (2009) (describing each of the concerns regarding
patents: cost, access, and innovation); see also Alice O. Martin & Sendil K. Devadas, Patents with an “I”
= Patients, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 261, 274 (2009) (positing there is no empirical data to show patents
have “any adverse effect on patient care or further innovation”).
181. Is Patent Protection Hindering or Helping Healthcare Management?, WALDEN UNIV., https://
www.waldenu.edu/programs/health/resource/is-patent-protection-hindering-healthcare-managemen
t#:~:text=Patent%20protection%20can%20raise%20healthcare%20costs.&text=Only%20when%20
a%20patent%20expires,parts%20of%20the%20healthcare%20system [https://perma.cc/WE7U-YW
N8].
182. See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic
Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1421 (2013) (highlighting the quid pro quo nature of patents as
justification for the increased cost caused by the monopoly).
183. Andrés Delgado et al., Inequality Explained: The Trouble with Pharmaceutical Patents, OPEN
CAN. (Jan. 20, 2016), https://opencanada.org/inequality-explained-trouble-pharmaceutical-patents/
[https://perma.cc/Y5EE-C9C2]; Is Patent Protection Hindering or Helping Healthcare Management?, supra
note 181.
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to begin innovating outside of the United States.184 As European and
Asian countries follow suit in increasing patent protection, the lure for
inventors and investors continues to rise.185 An increase in cost to the
patient may be necessary for the benefits patent protection provides; it not
only aids in the growth of the national and global economies, but it also
allows for continued innovation—an innovation that may one day save your
life or the life of someone you love.
In line with the increased cost is the perception that, as a result, patient
access to care and innovation is decreased. The logic follows that if there is
an increased cost, the marginalized portion of the population will not be
able to receive the treatment.186 Once again, there is some truth to this
perception. However, the distinction needs to be made between essential,
life-saving drugs, and non-essential drugs to treat erectile disfunction
access.187 Since the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
was passed, no patient who arrives at an emergency room may be denied
treatment; this goes to essential access.188 The argument stands that an
individual should not have to go to an emergency room for essential care.
A patient going to the E.R. for a diabetic coma is far more costly to the
patient, the hospital, and taxpayers than preventative treatment.189
However, much like with cost, the impact of lessening patent protection
reaches beyond this concern. Cost and access boil down to legislative
change; the government can aid in regulation of price and access to essential
healthcare without impacting innovation.190

184. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 11, at 1727 (explaining the motivation behind investors
choosing other locations outside the U.S. to conduct innovations).
185. Id. at 1728.
186. See David Branigan, Global Innovation Index 2019 Released, Focus On The Future of Medical
Innovation (July 24, 2019), https://healthpolicy-watch.news/global-innovation-index-2019-releasedfocus-on-the-future-of-medical-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/V6LD-MS4K] (“In the absence of
swift action, innovation in health and medicine may become a significant source of inequality . . . .”).
187. Colleen V. Chien, The Inequalities of Innovation, 1, 8 (Mar. 2, 2021)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157983 [https://perma.cc/J9UX-ASKW].
188. Kimberly Amadeo, Health Care Inequality in the US, BALANCE (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/health-care-inequality-facts-types-effect-solution-4174842
[perma.cc/KN9M-A47P].
189. Id.
190. See generally Dhruv Khullar & Peter B. Bach, 3 Actions Congress Can Take to Reduce Drug Prices,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (Feb. 21, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/02/3-actions-congress-can-take-toreduce-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/VU77-BQAE] (discussing three legislative solutions for
reducing healthcare costs).
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Finally, some fear patents hinder the very thing they were designed to
protect—innovation. The concern is that patents deter other inventors
from using patented material as a building block for further innovations.
Unlike cost and access, there is little evidence to support that such is the
case.191 In fact, surveyed data from scientists, executives, intellectual
property practitioners, academics, and government personnel showed that
patents do not impede innovation.192 To reinforce this fact, data shows
that infringement claims against other inventors are seldom brought to
court.
Given the data, for some the answer is clear—the positives of patent
protection for innovation outweigh the negatives. For others, it is less
certain. So, what is the alternative? For healthcare, the alternative is trade
secrets.193 The broadening of the scope for trade secret misappropriation
claims and the narrowing, uncertain scope of patent eligible subject matter
has caused a number of companies to turn to trade secrets.194 When a
company is granted a patent, they receive exclusive rights to make, use, sell,
or offer to sell the invention for a set period of time in exchange for full
disclosure of the innovation.195 Alternatively, trade secrecy hinges on the
company’s ability to keep the innovation a secret—if the information is
disclosed, the value is destroyed.196 This alternative seems to exacerbate
191. See François Lévêque & Yann Ménière, Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes?, CERNA 66
(Dec. 2006), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.958830 [https://perma.cc/N2YT-S7LG] (expressing
the false concern that patents deter innovation).
192. See id. at 67 (describing the method of defensive patenting and its’ ultimate goal of creating
an opportunity to bargain with other innovating firms).
193. See id. at 9 (“In fact, according to a US survey, secrecy and lead time are more popular than
patents amongst R&D managers to protect product and process innovations.”); see also James Pooley,
Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets, A Discussion Worth Revisiting, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/01/patents-and-trade-secrets-revisited/id=89641/
[https://perma.cc/DWS2-EW3U] (“Patenting and secrecy are the two major methods of protecting
technology that supports competitive advantage.”).
194. See Rachel Harris, Healthcare Industry Increasingly Using Trade Secret Litigation to Protect Intellectual
Property Rights, TRIAGE HEALTH L. (Aug. 13, 2018) https://www.triagehealthlawblog.com/lifesciences/healthcare-industry-increasingly-using-trade-secret-litigation-to-protect-intellectual-property
-rights/ [https://perma.cc/34S7-8FQ6] (“The combination of the broadened rights of the DTSA and
the narrowed scope of the Patent Act, may be leading more companies to use claims for trademark
misappropriation to protect their rights in federal court—and healthcare companies appear to be at the
forefront of this movement.”).
195. Steven R. Daniels & Sharae’ L. Williams, So You Want to Take a Trade Secret to a Patent Fight?
Managing the Conflicts between Patents and Trade Secret Rights, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2018-19/ju
ly-august/so-you-want-take-trade-secret-patent-fight/ [https://perma.cc/J4LL-LEG4].
196. Id.
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two of the main concerns of patents: access and innovation. By its nature,
secrecy inhibits access and innovation because no one is aware of the
workings, makeup, or composition of the innovation; it creates a monopoly
of its own.197 In the past, trade secrets have been used for “formulas or
techniques to develop pharmaceuticals, biosimilars, drugs, vaccines, or
medical devices; code for a medical technology software, testing results; and
patient analyses.”198 Given that the alternative has the same concerns,
some of which are bolstered by secrecy, patents become the clear choice for
patients and innovation.
Patients and Patents, one letter, one link—innovation. A commitment to
patients is a commitment to innovation. The United States is the choice of
patients for quality and innovative healthcare.199 Data shows that patients
choose the United States for its world-leading access to new medical
technology and treatment.200 This access is a direct result of the patent
system. Knowing the importance of patents and innovation to both people
and the economy, the current uncertainty is unacceptable. As we look at
cases from the last five years, the call on behalf of patients everywhere is for
reform and clarity in restoring the patent system to its former glory.

197. See Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 384–85 (2000) (inferring if patents disrupt the goal of free flowing
information, trade secrets would further do so).
198. Rebecca Edelson et al., Admonition to Members of the Healthcare Industry: Don’t Give Trade Secret
Protection the Short Shrift!, SHEPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (July 8, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=43af1203-c026-4e08-b6a7-b3f489a6b0c6 [https://
perma.cc/VF9Z-CUS3]; see Esha Bandyopadhyay & Bobby Hampton, Trade Secrets and Patents:
Similarities,
Differences,
and
Interplay,
JDSUPRA
(July 21,
2020),
https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trade-secrets-and-patents-similarities-20313/ [https://perma.cc/P8PL84KQ] (highlighting the wide availability of trade secrets for all technologies).
199. See Girvan & Roy, supra note 177 (describing why patients choose to be treated in the
United States).
200. Id.
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VI. GOING BLIND: THE COURT FURTHER DIMINISHES
THE I(NNOVATION)
With the establishment of the Mayo/Alice test, the Supreme Court
provided little direction to courts on what constitutes patent-eligible subject
matter. The murky language presented in both Mayo and Alice lent itself to
an overbroad application within the circuit courts. The test created
uncertainty and splits, not only amongst jurisdictions, but also within the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The test’s application seems to be
focused on the “inventive concept,” which bleeds into the statutory
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness. Both the test and the Court’s
explanation do little to illuminate what patent-eligible subject matter is
outside of these already established requirements. The cases that follow
highlight and underscore the uncertain and inconsistent application of the
Mayo/Alice test in recent years.
A. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequonom, Inc.201
Ariosa is often criticized as one of the many ground-breaking and lifesaving patents invalidated under the Mayo/Alice test.202 These claims
stemmed from the discovery of “cell-free fetal DNA (‘cffDNA’) in maternal
plasma and serum, the portion of maternal blood samples that other
researchers had previously discarded as medical waste.”203 Two doctors
discovered this DNA’s presence and used the already established processes
of amplification and detection to diagnose some genetic fetal disorders.204
The development of this method for diagnosing conditions, such as Down’s
syndrome, reduced the risk to both mother and child.205 Previously, these
tests and diagnoses could only be confirmed via “samples from the fetus or
placenta.”206 However, in applying the Alice/Mayo test, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the patent was invalid, as it was
directed to natural phenomena.207
In its determination as directed to a natural phenomenon, the first step
of the Alice/Mayo test, the court presented it as fact. Citing the patent
201.
202.
203.
204.
question).
205.
206.
207.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 750.
Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1373.
See id. at 1376 (describing the discovery and origin of the methods of the patent in
Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1378.
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descriptions themselves, the court stated the method in these claims both
began and ended with natural phenomenon, cell-free fetal DNA, and
paternally inherited cell-free fetal DNA, respectively.208 Given this seeming
clarity, they provided no other guidance and proceeded to step two. The
court, relying on Mayo, ruled the steps and elements added were not
sufficient for transformation of the claim.209 Drawing a comparison to the
appending of established methods for determining metabolite levels to the
claim in Mayo, the court felt as though Sequenom did the same.210
Ultimately, the appending of routine, conventional steps of amplification
and detection to the cell-free fetal DNA, was inadequate to supply the
necessary, transformative, and inventive concept.211
In a concurring opinion, Judge Linn expressed his strong disapproval of
the test and its application.212 While he agreed with the majority’s analysis
and conclusion under the Mayo/Alice test, Judge Linn “criticized [the test]
as overly broad and resulting in the invalidation of otherwise valid,
meritorious patents.”213 Judge Linn focused on the interpretation of the
second step as presented in Mayo. He argued, that while warranted given
the facts of that particular case, the exclusion of appending conventional
steps to a natural phenomenon is overbroad.214 In Diehr, the Court found
that “a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even
though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in
common use before the combination was made.”215 However, the blanket
dismissal of the addition of conventional steps in Mayo does not leave room
to distinguish cases that are more similar to Diehr.216 Judge Linn posited
the conventional steps appended in Mayo, those that the doctors were
already doing—“administering the drug at issue, measuring metabolite
levels, and adjusting dosing based on the metabolite levels”—fit into the

208. Id. at 1376.
209. See id. at 1376–77 (explaining the method under Mayo of how the natural phenomenon
must be transformed to be patentable).
210. See id. at 1377 (discussing the analysis in Mayo and its applicability to the patent in question).
211. Id. at 1378.
212. See id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (“[T]he breadth of the second part of the test was
unnecessary to the decision reached in Mayo.”); see also Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 749 (highlighting
the disapproval expressed by Judge Linn in his opinion).
213. Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring); Lindhorst, supra note 22, at 749.
214. See Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (discussing how the court
should have limited its interpretation addition of post-conventional steps to the circumstances in Mayo).
215. Id. at 1380 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
216. Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
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purpose for establishment of the Mayo/Alice test.217 Alternatively, in Ariosa,
while the steps were well-established, no one was performing these steps on
the paternally-inherited free-cell DNA in the mothers’ plasma and
serum.218 The distinguishing factor is the use of conventional steps in an
application never used, like in Diehr, as opposed to conventional steps used
on a new drug or gene as in Mayo. This view is congruent with the
characterization of Diehr in Alice. Despite a petition, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
There is no clarity on patent-eligible subject matter in these decisions; it
is simply based on precedent without more direct explanation. Ariosa is a
continued concern for those in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and lifesciences. If a court can recognize the importance of the innovation yet still
determine that it is not patent-eligible, how are they to proceed? Without
recognition for the fruits of their labor, why and how can inventors continue
to innovate?
B. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC219
Shortly after Ariosa, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit once
again faced the patent-eligible subject matter issue. In Genetic Techs, the claim
in question covered “a method of detecting a coding region of a person’s
genome by amplifying and analyzing a linked non-coding region of that
person’s genome.”220 Respondent argued the methods covered in the
patent provided various advantages to previously established methods,
including providing more information using short non-coding sequences as
opposed to longer DNA sequences.221 Despite the value of the innovation,
the court once again found the patent invalid. The court explained their
findings using the reasoning of the Mayo and Ariosa decisions. Beginning
with a comparison to Mayo, the court found that the claims were quite
similar.222 In Genetic Technologies, the Court dealt with claims that “required
analysis of a biological sample (the blood of a patient being treated with a
thiopurine drug) and in which the focus of the claimed advance over the
prior art was allegedly newly discovered information about human biology:
the likelihood that a patient could suffer toxic side effects from particular
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 1380–81 (Linn, J., concurring).
Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1374.
See id. at 1373 (explaining the various advantages of the patent).
Id. at 1375.
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doses of the drug.”223 Similarly, the court was facing a claim that required
the analysis of a biological sample, the non-coding sequence, improving
upon established prior art. As the Court in Mayo concluded, “the
relationship at issue . . . was entirely a consequence of the body’s natural
processes . . . , so too is the correlation here.”224 To further support their
conclusion, the court turned to Ariosa describing the claims as “remarkably
similar.”225 Much like the claim in Ariosa—in which the patent did not
claim the discovery of paternally inherited cell-free DNA but instead used
the discovery to improve prior art—the claim here focused on the
amplifying and analyzing the newly discovered link between non-coding and
coding sequences in the genome.226 As both methods begin and end with
a naturally occurring biological law, the claims are unpatentable subject
matter.227
In step two of the Mayo/Alice test, the court continued its comparisons.
In Mayo, the Court held that “the ‘wherein’ clauses simply tell a doctor about
the relevant natural laws, at most adding a suggestion that he should take
those laws into account when treating his patient.”228 Here, the court
determined the patent in question similarly gave a directive to the relevant
audience.229 The claims simply provided the directive to amplify and
analyze a newly-found non-coding sequences to make discoveries.230 Once
again, to further its finding, the court turned to Ariosa; Ariosa and Genetic
Techs are nearly identical. In both cases, the methods involve the appendage
of conventional steps of amplification and detection or analysis.231 The
court referred to these additional steps as mental processes.232 These
mental processes can be considered logical next steps, which would likely
follow the discovery to make it useful and applicable.233 As was ruled in
Ariosa, which built off the Mayo analysis, these additions are insufficient to
transform the claim.234
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. (“The claims in Ariosa covered a method of detecting fetal DNA . . . .”).
226. Id. at 1375–76.
227. Id. at 1376.
228. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012).
229. See Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1379 (explaining the directive given to the relevant audience).
230. See id. at 1378 (providing the directive instructions).
231. See id. at 1379 (explaining the similarities between the steps of Ariosa and Genetic Tech).
232. Id. at 1378.
233. See id. at 1379 (describing how the addition of a mental process does not constitute an
inventive step).
234. Id.
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In reaching the same fate as the patent in Ariosa, this claim is of concern
in considering the future of medical innovation in the United States. There
continues to be a lack of clarity surrounding the decisions, each one building
off its predecessor, offering no clear insight.
C. Vanda Pharmaceutical Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceutical
International Ltd.235
Two years following Genetic Tech., a case was brought to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that strongly resembled the patent
claims in Mayo. In Vanda Pharmaceutical Inc., the ‘610 patent filed by Vanda
claims a method for treating schizophrenia patients with iloperidone.236
The patent included “analyzing the patient’s genotype and determining the
proper iloperidone dosage based on that genotype.”237 The Mayo claims,
held as ineligible subject matter, were directed at a method for helping
physicians determine proper dosage levels of thiopurine drugs used to treat
autoimmune diseases.238 Given the identicalities, the result seems obvious.
However, the ‘610 patent was held as patent-eligible subject matter,
demonstrating just how thin the line between eligible and ineligible subject
matter is.
The court spent a majority of the opinion distinguishing Mayo from
Vanda, identifying three differentiating factors. First, the claims were
directed to a method of treating a disease.239 While in Mayo, the claims
were instead directed to a diagnostic method of optimizing treatment.240
Both patent claims rely on determining an individual’s ability to metabolize
a drug in order to determine the correct dosage of that drug; the difference
is in the language.241 The majority felt that while the ‘610 patent recognized
the relationship between iloperidone and levels of metabolites in the body,
235. Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
236. Id. at 1121.
237. Stephanie Sivinski, Vanda v. West-Ward: This Time, Dosage Adjustment Claims are Patent
Eligible Subject Matter, IP WATCHDOG (May 16, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
05/16/vanda-v-west-ward-dosage-adjustment-claims-patent-eligible/id=97117/ [https://perma.cc/
C78C-UZ9F].
238. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (explaining
the method doctors used).
239. Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1135.
240. See id. at 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Mayo claimed a method for ‘optimizing’ the dosage of
thiopurine drugs by administering thiopurine drugs to a patient and measuring the level of certain
metabolites in the blood . . . .”).
241. See Sivinski, supra note 237 (“Both claims correlate an individual’s ability to metabolize the
drug with the proper dosage for that individual.”).
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it did not claim this relationship, only an application of it, in the treatment
of a particular disease.242 Alternatively, the court asserted the Mayo patent
sought to claim the natural relationship.243 Second, the court focused on
use as opposed to observation. The majority observed that, unlike in Mayo
where the claim “did not go beyond recognizing . . . a need to increase or
decrease a dose[,]” the ‘610 patent involved the doctors using the natural
relationship.244 The claims in Mayo were said to “broadly ‘tie up the
doctor’s subsequent treatment decision[,]’” while the claims in Vanda did
not.245 Third, the court looked at the specificity of each patent. The ‘610
patent instructed physicians to administer one of two dose ranges depending
on the genotype results, explaining how the dosage ranges correlate with the
risks.246 In Mayo, the claim instead stated the “metabolite level in the blood
simply ‘indicates’ a need to increase or decrease dosage, without prescribing
a specific dosage regimen . . . .”247 This generality left the claim too broad.
All of these “distinguishing” factors led to the conclusion that the ‘610
patent was not directed to a natural law. Rather, the claim was a method of
treatment that is patent-eligible subject matter. As such, the court found no
need to proceed to the second step.
The fine line drawn between Mayo and Vanda emphasizes the difficulty
courts have had in applying the Mayo/Alice test.248 Particular language and
a certain level of specificity appear to transform ineligible subject matter into
eligible subject matter. Various articles were written attempting to
understand the distinguishing factors the majority observed were so
clear.249 Chief Judge Prost felt the majority was splitting hairs and many
242. See Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1135 (providing the recognized relationship between
iloperidone and level of metabolites in the body).
243. See id. (highlighting the differences in Vanda claiming an application of a natural
relationship and Mayo claiming the relationship).
244. Id.
245. See id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 86
(2012)).
246. See id. (describing the two dose ranges).
247. Id.
248. See Sivinski, supra note 237 (“While the ultimate patentability conclusions are opposite, the
claims in Vanda and Mayo are very similar, highlighting the thin–and often unpredictable–line that
divides eligible and ineligible subject matter.”).
249. See Caroline L. Masili, The Federal Circuit Skips the Mayo in Upholding Vanda’s Fanapt Patent,
CARLSON CASPERS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.carlsoncaspers.com/federal-circuit-skips-the-mayoin-upholding-vandas-fanapt-patent/ [https://perma.cc/26XC-3BRH] (asserting the distinguishing
factors were nothing but language tweaks that allowed the patent to “skip” Mayo); see also Sivinski, supra
note 237 (attempting to decipher the distinguishing features highlighted by the majority); Courtenay C.
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agreed with her. In her dissent, she asserted the majority conflated the
inquiry of steps one and two of the Mayo/Alice test.250
In
Chief Judge Prost’s view, the claim was directed to a law of nature, and the
question was whether an “inventive step” existed to transform the claim.251
Even then, she felt the distinguishing factors relied on were not enough to
constitute this “inventive concept” and did not withstand scrutiny.252 The
basis of the claims being nearly identical, along with discord between judges,
results in the fear of uncertainty stemming from the Mayo/Alice test to
permeate further.

Brinkerhoff, Federal Circuit Upholds Method Of Treatment Claims Under Vanda And Distinguishes Mayo,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER,
LLP
(Mar. 26,
2019),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/03/federal-circuit-upholds-method-oftreatment-claims [https://perma.cc/PD6K-J5MG] (discussing the murky language that surrounds
eligibility for method of treatment claims following Vanda); Warren Woessner, Federal Circuit Circumvents
Mayo/Alice
Rule
in
Vanda
v.
West-Ward,
PATENTS4LIFE
(Apr. 17,
2018),
https://www.patents4life.com/2018/04/federal-circuit-circumvents-mayo-alice-rule-vanda-v-westward/ [https://perma.cc/AUS3-SCVR] (interpreting the holding in terms of future method of
treatment claims).
250. Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1140 (Prost, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 1143 (Prost, J., dissenting) (“[T]he end result of the claimed process is no more
than the conclusion of a natural law.”).
252. Id. at 1140 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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D. Natural Alternatives. International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds,
LLC253
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
doubled down on its holding Vanda. Natural Alternatives had a series of
patents challenged for subject matter eligibility under Section 101; the
patents included methods of treatment claims, product claims, and
manufacturing claims—all of which were deemed subject matter eligible.
Natural Alternatives’ patents were all related to the amino acid betaalanine.254 More specifically, “[t]he claimed patents generally relate to the
use of beta-alanine in a dietary supplement to ‘increas[e] the anaerobic
working capacity of muscle and other tissue.’”255
The court began by addressing the “method claims.”256 Relying on its
holding in Vanda, the court reinforced that method of treatment claims are
patent-eligible. In Natural Alternatives, the patent encompassed the
administration of the specified dosage in the specified form in the specified
manner in order to alter “the athlete’s physiology to provide the described
benefits.”257 This language is reminiscent of that in the Vanda claim, which
required a genetic test to determine the appropriate level of iloperidone to
selected and administered from those denoted in the patent.258 The court
focused on reinforcing the difference between Vanda and Mayo. Mayo
involved the administration of a prior art drug-based to a subject, measuring
the level of metabolite, and using the metabolite levels to indicate an increase
or decrease in the dosage.259 However, the patent did not directly require
the dosage level be altered as a result of the test, leaving it short of a method
of treatment claim.260 Alternatively, Vanda and Mayo affirmatively require
the administration of the specified dosage to alter the patient’s natural state,
it is “a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific

253. Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
254. Id. at 1349.
255. Id. at 1341 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5965596 A (issued Oct. 12, 1999)).
256. Id. at 1343.
257. Id. at 1344.
258. See Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (explaining the method for treating a patient with iloperidone).
259. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 74 (2012)
(“The patent claims at issue here set forth processes embodying researchers’ findings that identified
these correlations with some precision.”).
260. See id. at 75–76 (providing the courts findings that the test did not require a change in
dosage).
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compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.”261 The court
found that here, “the Method Claims contain specific elements that clearly
establish they are doing more than simply reciting a natural law.”262
The product claims were found patent eligible as they too were not
directed at a natural law. The court held that “[a] claim to a manufacture or
composition of matter made from a natural product is not directed to the
natural product where it has different characteristics and ‘the potential for
significant utility.’”263 As the method claims are directed toward the
application of a natural law, the product claims are directed to a specific
formulation that contains a natural product but has different characteristics
and increases its utility.264 The court took care to differentiate this from
Funk Brothers, where the “mixture of two naturally occurring bacteria were
held not patent eligible.”265 In Funk Brothers, the claimed combination did
little to increase the range of utility or improve their natural function.266
Here, there is evidence that shows the product will have both increased
utility and additional effects that would not be realized by the two natural
products individually.267
Finally, the court quickly found the manufacturing claims to be patent
eligible as they are “even further removed from the natural law and product
of nature at issue in the Method Claims and Product Claims,
respectively.”268 The court highlighted that the claims in question were to
a dietary supplement, “not a product of nature[,] and the use of the
supplement to achieve a given result is not directed to a law of nature.”269
Despite its reliance on a case that increased uncertainty, Natural
Alternatives provided some guidance on what patent eligible subject matter
is. By doubling down on Vanda, the court provided answers regarding how
to use language to transform a claim into a method of treatment, which by
definition is patent eligible. For the first time in a long time, the court made
a stride in defining the line.

261. Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1136.
262. Creative Compounds, 918 F.3d at 1345.
263. Id. at 1348 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1349.
266. See id. (“The combination of the bacteria into the same package did ‘not improve in any
way their natural function.’”).
267. See id. (conveying the record indicating the effects to the products individually).
268. Id. at 1350.
269. Id.
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E. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.270
Shortly after Natural Alternatives, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit again declared method of treatment claims patent eligible
subject matter. Endo Pharmaceuticals claimed a treatment method using
oxymorphone to safely and effectively treat the pain of patients with
impaired kidney function, also known as renal impairment.271 Following
the lead of Natural Alternatives, the court once again relied on Vanda to
distinguish this claim as a method of treatment, emphasizing the language
and specificity of the patent. The patent title, abstract, and claims all include
language to the effect of “[a] method of treating pain in a renally
impaired.”272 Additionally, the claim requires specific steps: “(a) providing
a pharmaceutical[;] (b) testing the patient for a disease state[;] and then
(c) administering the pharmaceutical . . . based on the [results].”273 Despite
using broader language, the court held the claims contained enough limiting
language to make them as specific as those in Vanda. The court continued
with a comparison to Ariosa, noting the distinction in the method of
treatment and the method of detection. In Ariosa, the claims were directed
to the natural law; they start and end with naturally occurring phenomenon,
instructing doctors to apply conventional techniques to plasma which was
previously considered waste.274 Here, the claims do not start and end with
a naturally occurring phenomenon and require the physician to administer
dosage based on test results.275 While Ariosa is a method claim, it is a
method of detection claim equating to little more than a claim on the natural
phenomenon.276
Similar to Natural Alternatives, Endo further underlined the importance of
language and specificity in patent claims. The case provided further
guidance to inventors and legal professionals on the application and
expectations regarding Mayo/Alice and method of treatment claims.
Despite slight improvements regarding the method of treatment claims,
patent-eligible subject matter is still as uncertain as ever. Given the
prevalence of healthcare related innovations in recent cases, such as those
270. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
271. See id. at 1349 (“[T]he inventor’s treatment method advantageously allows patients with
renal impairment to ingest less oxymorphone while still treating their pain.”).
272. Id. at 1353 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 8808737 B2 (issued Aug. 19, 2014)).
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1356 (providing the holding from Ariosa).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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above, this uncertainty will inevitably have a direct impact on the economy
and patients. The uncertainty, coupled with the increasing costs of research
and development, is destined to lead to the disappearance of innovation in
healthcare. The question is, how can we alter the course before innovation
is truly gone.
VII. ONE I ON THE ROAD
Patents, innovation, and the legislature are a crossroads. Congress heard
the call from inventors, investors, academics, and judges to take action
against the uncertainty of patent-eligible subject matter.277 They have
proposed a two-step test to address the concerns: (1) whether the
Mayo/Alice framework should be repealed; and (2) if/how should
Section 101 reformed? As with all things, there are pros and cons to each.
A. The First Step: To Repeal or Not Repeal
As discussed, this test for patentable subject-matter has received
criticisms from numerous sources. However, the principal complaints are
the same: (1) vague and subjective; (2) over-reaching; (3) diminishing
innovation; and (4) uncertainty and chaos.278
First, the framework has been repeatedly admonished for its lack of
clarity.279 The Court failed to define key terms, such as “abstract idea,” or
what constitutes enough to transform a claim, i.e., “an inventive
concept.”280 While a framework existed, there was no objective criteria.
Instead, judges were left to analyze the language and specificity of the claims.
All of this meant that the eligibility of your patent was largely determined by
the panel of judges assigned.281 In response, defenders of the framework
interpret the vagueness and subjectivity as flexibility and adaptability to new
technologies.282

277. See Tran & Benevento, supra note 162, at 30 (highlighting judges, confused by the
application of the Mayo/Alice test, are calling for congressional intervention).
278. See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Reform in the 116th Congress, CONG.
RSCH. SERV. 20–23 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45918.pdf (describing the four
principal criticisms of the Mayo/Alice framework).
279. See id. at 21 (explaining the elements of the framework that led to a lack of clarity).
280. Id.
281. See id. (“T[he] subjectivity, in the view of critics, injects unpredictability and uncertainty
into whether an invention is of a type that is patentable.”).
282. Id. at 23.
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Second, the framework reaches far beyond the statutory language for
subject matter eligibility.283 In fact, the test is focused on the three judicially
created exceptions, “law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea,”
and the “inventive concept,” none of which exist in the statute.284 Further,
the framework blends the analyses of subject matter eligibility, novelty, and
non-obviousness through the “inventive concept” requirement.285 Here,
defenders rely on stare decisis.286 While the language may not be included
in the statute, it has been treated as such for years. Additionally,
commentators argue that the “inventive concept” analysis goes beyond the
novel and non-obvious requirements to consider future impact and moral
dilemma.287
Third, the framework has diminished innovation.288 This impact was
particularly felt in the healthcare sector. Given the claims in the cases
described above, it is clear that the biotechnology, medical device, and
pharmaceutical industries have been severely affected.289 Without promise
of protection, inventors in these industries are looking elsewhere.290
Defenders assert that the framework prevents the issuance of overbroad
claims, which slow innovation.291
Fourth, the framework has caused uncertainty and chaos.292 The
uncertainty led to a weakened patent system, which in turn led to the loss of
the competitive edge the United States had as a global innovation leader.293
Defenders relish the thought of increasing national competition, lowering
costs, and increasing access to innovations as the weakened patent system
fails to protect innovation.294

283. See id. at 21–22 (listing the reasons some interpret the Mayo/Alice test as legally flawed).
284. Id. at 16.
285. See id. at 22 (explaining the analyses through the “inventive concept” thoroughly).
286. Id. at 25.
287. Id. at 24.
288. See id. at 22 (providing evidence of the impact the framework had on innovations in the
biotechnology region).
289. See Falati, supra note 4, at 36 (comparing the affected industries with other countries whose
patent eligibility laws are more robust than the United States).
290. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 11, at 1727.
291. Hickey, supra note 278, at 25.
292. Id. at 22.
293. Cahoy, supra note 154, at 3.
294. See Hickey, supra note 278, at 24 (establishing the defenders’ arguments).
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B. The Second Step: Section 101 Reform?
This option may be surprising given that the statutory language of
Section 101 has remained virtually unchanged since before the enactment
of the Patent Act of 1952. In evaluating whether and how to reform
Section 101, it is important to consider the reason a call for reformation was
made in the first place—not the statutory language, but instead the judicial
framework. Parallel to the four principal criticisms of the framework, there
are four potential statutory reformations.
First, stay out of it. Congress can leave Section 101 unchanged and allow
the courts to continue to define patent-eligible subject matter.295 This
option will please those who support the Mayo/Alice framework, those who
feel the court is on the path to clarity, and those who fundamentally believe
that the language of Section 101 fits the framework’s purpose.296
Second, make a list. Congress can choose to replace the Mayo/Alice
framework with an amended Section 101 that contains a list of subject
matter that is or is not patent-eligible.297 This option would provide
concrete, objective criteria for eligibility. In doing so, however, it would
completely take away any flexibility.298
Third, a new framework. Congress can repeal the Mayo/Alice framework
in favor of a new, legislative standard.299 This option would leave the
statutory language as is and provide a new test for subject matter eligibility.
However, the determination and eventual impact of the new standard leave
room for uncertainty.
Finally, goodbye Mayo/Alice. Congress can simply repeal the Mayo/Alice
framework, leaving the statutory language as the guide for patent-eligible
subject matter.300
C. Through the Patient’s Eyes
Every individual approaches a decision with a unique perspective
influenced by upbringing, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, etc. But one
perspective that everyone can relate to is that of being a patient. At some
point in our lives, we have all felt, seen, or experienced the impact of medical
295.
296.
develop).
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 26.
See id. at 27 (describing the various supporters of allowing the judicial law to continue to
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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innovation. With that in mind, the first step of the Congress-proposed twostep solution is easy—repeal the Mayo/Alice framework. This test created
hysteria in the healthcare sector, diminished innovation, pushed research
and development out of the United States, and cost the country its
innovation crown. The fact is, innovation spurs economic growth, and the
healthcare industry is one of the country’s most innovative. These
innovations, protected by patents, pushed the United States to be a first
choice amongst patients as they seek access to the newest tests and
treatments.301 The United States has a reputation for providing quality,
innovative healthcare to every patient.
The second step of the solution, while not as clear given the possibilities,
is still discernable—leave the statute alone. The United States rose to
innovative healthcare prominence on the coattails of a strong patent system
created by the language in Section 101. The history of patent-eligible subject
matter under the statute was clear, understandable, and easily applicable. In
the years before Mayo/Alice, the statute allowed for various medical patents
ranging from diagnostic tests to gene therapy. There was no reason to fix
what was not broken. A return to the strong patent system that built our
healthcare sector is in the interest of all patients and people. Despite the
slight increase in cost and slight decrease in access, patents create quality
healthcare and push innovation. When healthcare innovation booms,
patients win—which means we all win.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The creation of the Mayo/Alice two-step test for patent eligible subject
matter flipped the patent world upside down. Following its establishment,
invalidation rates soared—particularly in the healthcare sector—impacting
patients everywhere.302 The importance of patents in healthcare innovation
and innovation generally has been emphasized as the consequences of this
framework are realized. The United States is no longer seen as a clear leader
in innovation, and as a result, the economy is at risk. Start-ups and investors
have turned to foreign nations where return on their investments in
innovation are protected.303 This level of uncertainty regarding patents has
never been seen in the United States. As a country that has emphasized the

301. Girvan & Roy, supra note 177.
302. See Falati, supra note 4, at 36 (providing a list of additional impacted fields).
303. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 11, at 1727 (explaining why start-ups and investors are
turning to foreign nations).
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importance of cutting-edge quality care for patients, all that we know is in
question. To preserve the healthcare industry, Congress must step-up; in
repealing the Mayo/Alice framework, there is hope that the patent system
may return to its former glory. But it is up to us, the patients, to fight for
the healthcare that we deserve. Our lives, the lives of the ones we love, and
the lives of those we don’t know are impacted by this. Focus the patents
back on the patients and return the “I” of innovation.
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